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Workers' Compensation
by H. Michael Bagley*
and J. Benson Ward**
The 2014-2015 survey period included decisions of the appellate courts
on a wide variety of issues impacting the workers' compensation system,
ranging from the average weekly wage to the statutes of limitation.'
I.

LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

The bill drafted by Chairman Frank McKay's State Board of Workers'
Compensation's Advisory Council passed through four committees and
both chambers of the Legislature without a dissenting vote and was
signed into law by Governor Nathan Deal.2 The primary feature of the
legislation was to address Estate of Mack Pitts v. City of Atlanta3 and
the concerns regarding the impact of the decision.' In Estate of Mack
Pitts, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the "exclusive remedy"
provision of the Georgia Workers Compensation Act, section 34-9-11 of
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), did not bar the
plaintiffs from seeking damages for "breach of the contract" against the
defendants who otherwise would have been considered "statutory"
employers immune from suit for damages for a workplace accident and

* Partner in the firm of Drew, Eck1 & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1977); University of Georgia (J.D., 1980). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Drew, Eck1 & Farnham, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Georgia (B.A., summa cum laude, 2002); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 2005). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Workers' Compensation law during the prior survey period, see
H. Michael Bagley & J. Benson Ward, Workers' Compensation,Annual Survey of Georgia
Law, 66 MERCER L. REV. 247 (2014).
2. Ga. H.R. Bill 412, Reg. Sess. (2015).
3. 312 Ga. App. 599, 719 S.E.2d 7 (2011), cert. granted, 292 Ga. 219, 735 S.E.2d 772
(2012), remanded to 323 Ga. App. 70, 746 S.E.2d 698 (2013) (reaffirmed).
4. See generally Ga. H.R. Bill 412 § 1.
5. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11(a) (2008 & Supp. 2015).
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a resulting injury (in this case death).6 To reach this decision, the court
concluded the injury for which the plaintiffs sought damages "is not a
physical injury but instead is the loss of access to insurance coverage
occasioned by the defendants' alleged breach of contract."7
The
plaintiffs already had recovered the specified relief under the Workers'
Compensation Act' for this worksite injury and, in a separate action,
sought and obtained a judgment against the third party that caused the
accident for damages based on the death resulting from the physical
injuries sustained in a job site accident.' However, the court of appeals
reasoned that because the plaintiffs' claim purportedly sought "damages
for breach of contract, not personal injury, . . . the Workers' Compensation Act provide[d] no specific remedy for the damages sought.""o
Accordingly, the court concluded that the Act is not applicable to a
"breach of contract" action, thus the claim was not barred by the Act's
exclusive remedy provision."
Attempting to address concerns regarding the perceived erosion of the
exclusive remedy doctrine in the aftermath of this decision, O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-1112 was amended to emphasize that the Workers' Compensation
Act (the Act) granted rights and remedies to employees who shall "be in
place of all other rights and remedies . . . at common law or otherwise,
on account of [the] injury, loss of service, or death," unless the employer
expressly agrees, "in writing, to specific additional rights and remedies."' 3

The amendment further clarified that "the use of contractual

provisions generally relating to workplace safety . . . compliance with
laws or regulations, or . . . relating to liability insurance requirements
shall not be construed to create rights and remedies beyond those
provided" in the Workers' Compensation Act. 14 The maximum weekly
benefit payable for temporary total disability was increased from $525
to $550,'" and the maximum weekly benefit payable for temporary
partial disability was increased from $350 to $367.16
The legislation also amends the maximum benefit payable to a
surviving spouse as a sole dependent at the time of death from $150,000

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Estate of Pitts, 312 Ga. App. at 605-06, 719 S.E.2d at 16-17.
Id.
O.C.G.A. §§ 34-9-1 to -421 (2008 & Supp. 2015).
Estate of Mack Pitts, 312 Ga. App. at 606-07, 719 S.E.2d at 16-17.
Id. at 607, 719 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 607, 719 S.E.2d at 17-18.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11 (2008 & Supp. 2015).
Ga. H.R. Bill 412 § 1 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11).
Id. (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-11).
Id. § 3 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-261 (2008 & Supp. 2015)).
Id. § 4 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-262 (2008 & Supp. 2015)).
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to an indexed amount not to exceed 400 weeks at the maximum
prevailing rate for temporary total disability.1 7 In addition, the bill
moves the sunset date for the Subsequent Injury Trust Fund from 2020
to 2023 and transfers oversight at that time from the State Board of
Workers' Compensation to the Department of Insurance.18
II.

REFUSAL OF LIGHT DUTY WORK

The claimant in Brasher v. U.S. Xpress Enterprises, Inc.," a longhaul truck driver, was injured while on the road and treated in a local
emergency room. He reported the injury to his employer but allegedly
was not provided with medical treatment or a list of a panel of treating
physicians, so he continued to seek treatment occasionally with urgent
care facilities on his own, receiving work restrictions. Less than a
month after the accident, the employer offered suitable light duty work
at another location and provided the claimant with a bus ticket to that
location. The claimant remained at this job for five hours and then left,
signing a form that he was declining the job for financial reasons.
Following a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) awarded income
benefits from the date of the accident through the date the claimant
presented to the light duty job. However, the ALJ declined further
income benefits after that date due to the claimant's unjustified refusal
to perform this work and assigned the claimant's former surgeon as his
authorized treating physician (ATP). The Appellate Division of the State
Board of Workers' Compensation (Appellate Division) adopted this
decision, and the superior court affirmed the decision by operation of
law.20
The court of appeals reversed the ATP appointment because there was
no evidence that the employer posted or presented a panel of physicians
to the claimant or otherwise facilitated his medical treatment.2 1 The
court only affirmed the ALJ's awarding of income benefits up until the
commencement of the light duty job, holding that the light duty work
was appropriate and the claimant's refusal was not justified.22 In
response to the claimant's argument that the long bus ride to the light
duty job disrupted his life, the court noted that as a long-haul truck
driver who traveled across the country, the claimant was accustomed to

17. Id. § 5 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-265 (2008 & Supp. 2015)).
18. Id. § 7 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-358 (2008 & Supp. 2015)).
19. 328 Ga. App. 20, 761 S.E.2d 448 (2014).
20. Id. at 21, 22, 23, 761 S.E.2d at 450-51, 452.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 25, 761 S.E.2d at 452-53.
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long periods away from home. 23 The claimant's reliance on an urgent
care work status note that ambiguously stated "no activity" did not
compel a finding that he was entitled to ongoing income benefits.2
Finally, the court rejected the claimant's contention that his due process
or equal protection rights were violated.2
III.

INJURIES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT

In Chambers v. Monroe County Board of Commissioners,26 the court
of appeals revisited the concept of idiopathic injuries. The claimant, a
firefighter and emergency medical technician, returned to the fire station
from a call and sat at a desk, completing paperwork and watching
television. When her supervisor asked her to get up from the desk so
that he could use it, she rose from her chair and heard a "pop" in her left
knee." "The ALJ found the [knee] injury compensable on the basis
that [the claimant] was required to be in the location where she was
injured and was following her supervisor's orders;" however, the
Appellate Division vacated and reversed the award because there was
"no evidence that the [claimant] slipped, tripped, or fell or came in
contact with any object or hazard that increased her risk of injury ...
she simply rose from a seated position."" The superior court affirmed."
The court of appeals noted that the claimant presented no testimony
or evidence that established any causal connection between the
employment and the injury (such as a unique desk configuration, a fire
alarm causing her to hurriedly exit the chair, or any contact with
another object).3 ' The court noted prior decisions addressing this issue,
including the two 2009 decisions, St. Joseph's Hospital v. Ward3 ' and
Harris v. Peach County Board of Commissioners, and the court stated
that the issue may be reconciled through the common strand of the
appellate courts giving great deference to the ALJ's and Appellate
Division's fact-finding role.3 3 Because some evidence existed to support
the Appellate Division's determination that the injury was not causally

23. Id. at 25-26, 761 S.E.2d at 453.
24. Id. at 26, 761 S.E.2d at 453.
25. Id. at 27, 761 S.E.2d at 454.

26. 328 Ga. App. 403, 762 S.E.2d 133 (2014).
27. Id. at 404, 762 S.E.2d at 133.
28. Id. at 404, 762 S.E.2d at 134.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 405, 762 S.E.2d at 134.
31. 300 Ga. App. 845, 686 S.E.2d 443 (2009).
32. 296 Ga. App. 225, 674 S.E.2d 36 (2009).
33. Chambers, 328 Ga. App. at 405-06, 762 S.E.2d at 134.
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connected to the employment, the court upheld the Appellate Division's
award that denied the claim.3 4
IV.

CHANGE IN CONDITION/FICTIONAL NEW ACCIDENT

This survey period featured another foray into the distinction between
a change in condition and a fictional new accident. The claimant in ABF
Freight System, Inc. v. Presley" sustained a compensable right knee
injury in June 2009, underwent surgery, and returned to work, and
subsequently sustained a compensable left knee injury in December 2009
that he also underwent surgery for prior to returning to work. After
more than a year of performing regular duty work, he underwent total
knee replacement surgery on the right knee and sought income benefits
during the period he was out of work after the procedure on the grounds
that he sustained a fictional new injury."
The ALJ determined that the claimant instead had sustained a change
in condition for the worse because there were no new or different
circumstances concerning his job duties that caused a new injury since
the compensable 2009 injury. The Appellate Division adopted this
decision." "The superior court remanded ...
for a determination
regarding whether [the claimant's] left knee injuries constitute[d] 'new
circumstances' that caused a worsening of the right knee. . . .""
However, the court of appeals noted that "the ALJ and the [Appellate
Division] did consider whether [the] left knee injuries caused a
worsening of [the] right knee condition," and they found that the injuries
did not and "the evidence support[ed] the ALJ and [Appellate Division's
conclusion] that [the] right knee was never the same after surgery and
[progressively worsened] without any additional injuries or job [duties]." 9 Because evidence existed to support the Appellate Division's
findings, the Appellate Division's findings must be affirmed. 0
V.

LATE PAYMENT PENALTY/CHANGE IN CONDITION

Revisiting and reversing a case from last year's survey, the Georgia
Supreme Court held, in Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
v. Reid,4 1 that the provision in O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) 42 that contained

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 407, 762 S.E.2d at 136.
330 Ga. App. 885, 769 S.E.2d 611 (2015).
Id. at 885, 886, 769 S.E.2d at 613.
Id. at 887, 769 S.E.2d at 614.
Id. at 888, 769 S.E.2d at 615.
Id.
Id. at 889, 769 S.E.2d at 615.
295 Ga. 863, S.E.2d 695 (2014).
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the change in condition statute of limitations is "the proper statute of
limitations for a claim of statutory penalties for late benefits payments." 3 Eight years after his last payment of income benefits, the
claimant in Reid requested a hearing, seeking late payment penalties on
twelve benefit checks." The ALJ found that the claim for statutory
penalties constituted a change in condition under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1044*
because additional benefits were requested. 46 The claim was therefore
barred under that statute's two-year limitation period. 47 The decision
was affirmed by the Appellate Division and the superior court. 48
However, the court of appeals reversed and applied the general statute
of limitations, O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82,49 instead of the change in condition
statute of limitations, to the request for late payment penalties.so
The Georgia Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that the
court of appeals failed to consider a change in "status" when evaluating
the definition of a "change in condition" under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104."
The court defined "status" to include "the legal condition of an employee
in the context of the employer-employee relationship" and concluded that
the claimant's status "was first established when [the] employer
[commenced income] benefits voluntarily and [was] last established when
the last benefit payment was made."5 2 Any further change in the
claimant's status was governed by the change in condition statute of
limitations under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b), and because the claimant
waited more than two years to request additional benefits pursuant to
a change in his status, his claim was time-barred."
VI.

PAYMENT OF BENEFITS/STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The change in condition statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 34-9104(b) was addressed during this survey period by the court of appeals
in the context of last payment of benefits. In Lane v. Williams,54 the
claimant sustained a compensable claim, and the employer suspended

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) (2008).
Reid, 295 Ga. at 863-64, 763 S.E.2d at 696.
Id. at 863, 763 S.E.2d at 696.
O.G.C.A. § 34-9-104 (2008).
Reid, 295 Ga. at 864, 763 S.E.2d at 696.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-82 (2008).
Reid, 295 Ga. at 864, 763 S.E.2d at 696.
Id. at 865, 763 S.E.2d at 697.
Id. at 866, 866-67, 763 S.E.2d at 697-98.
Id. at 865, 867, 763 S.E.2d at 697, 698.
330 Ga. App. 416, 766 S.E.2d 482 (2014).
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benefits, mailing the last income benefit payment on March 9, 2010
(paying benefits through March 10, 2010). Also on March 9, 2010, the
claimant moved for an interlocutory recommencement of income benefits,
which the ALJ denied in an order suggesting that an evidentiary
hearing would be necessary. However, the claimant did not request a
hearing until March 13, 2012, and accordingly, the ALJ found that the
two-year statute of limitations under O.C.G.A. § 34-9-104(b) barred the
request for reinstatement of income benefits." The court of appeals
confirmed that an income benefit payment is "actually made" when it is
placed in the mail, not when the claimant received it. 6 Because the
claimant's hearing request was not filed until more than two years after
the last payment was placed in the mail, the request for additional
income benefits was time-barred."
VII.

INGRESS/EGRESS RULE

In Bonner-Hill v. Southland Waste Systems," the employee was
driving on an entrance road across railroad tracks when his vehicle was
struck by a train; the injuries resulted in his death, and his wife brought
a death and dependency benefits claim." The ALJ found that the
claim was compensable because "the short entrance road, which crossed
the railroad track, was the only route by which [the employee] could
access his workplace;" the employer's lease agreement for the premises
included a non-exclusive right to use the access road; "the entrance road
was part of the business premises;" and the employer had control over
The Board reversed, holding that "the inthe entrance road."o
gress/egress rule did not apply .... because [the employer] did not
exclusively own, maintain, or control the entrance road [on] which [the
employee] was traveling," and that "[the claimant] had not [yet] arrived
at work" at the time of the accident.
The court of appeals noted that accidents occurring while employees
travel to or from work generally are not compensable; however, the
ingress-egress exception renders accidents compensable when the
"employee is injured while on the employer's preniises in the act of going
to or coming from . . . work."62 The court framed the ingress-egress

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 417, 766 S.E.2d at 483, 484.
Id. at 420, 766 S.E.2d at 485.
Id.
330 Ga. App. 151, 767 S.E.2d 803 (2014).
Id. at 152, 767 S.E.2d at 805.
Id.
Id. at 152-53, 767 S.E.2d at 805.
Id. at 153, 154, 767 S.E.2d at 806.

294

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

exception as applying in situations where the accident occurs in an area
that is either "(1) limited (or very nearly so) to the respondent business,
even if the business's right to the area is merely a leasehold interest or
some other nonexclusive access; or (2) owned, maintained, or controlled
by the business . . . ."" Under that framework, because the lease
provided that the premises included access to the property over the
entrance road, the court held that the employee had arrived at the
employer's premises at the time of the accident and, thus, the ingressegress exception applied.64 In a separate concurring opinion, Judge
Dillard expressly concurred in judgment only and noted that the
majority opinion thus "may not be cited as binding precedent."6 5
VIII. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION
The court of appeals upheld that the application of the exclusive
remedy provision precludes tort claims against a general contractor for
an out-of-state injury. In Smith v. Graham Construction Co.,66 the
claimant-an employee of a subcontractor on a construction project in
North Carolina-received workers' compensation benefits under Georgia
law. The claimant and his wife sued the general contractor for
negligence and loss of consortium, and the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the general contractor because the suit was barred
by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act as set forth in O.C.G.A.
§ 34-9-11(a). While under North Carolina law only the subcontractor,
and not the general contractor, would be considered a "statutory
employer"-and thus, the general contractor would not be immune from
civil suit-the court of appeals held that the trial court correctly applied
Georgia substantive law because application of North Carolina substantive law would contravene Georgia public policy."
IX.

DEATH AND DEPENDENCY BENEFITS

In Barzey v. City of Cuthbert,68 the Georgia Supreme Court held that
the Act's limitation on the recovery of death benefits by a deceased
employee's non-dependent heirs does not violate federal due process or
equal protection rights.6 9 The deceased employee in Barzey was not

63. Id. at 155, 767 S.E.2d at 806-07.
64. Id. at 155, 767 S.E.2d at 807.
65. Id. at 156, 767 S.E.2d at 807 (Dillard, J., concurring in judgment).
66. 327 Ga. App. 823, 761 S.E.2d 370 (2014).
67. Id. at 823-24, 824, 761 S.E.2d at 371, 371-72, 372.
68. 295 Ga. 641, 763 S.E.2d 447 (2014).
69. Id. at 646, 763 S.E.2d at 453.
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married, had no dependents, and his mother was his only heir at law."
His mother brought suit against the City of Cuthbert, contending that
the Act violated her due process and equal protection rights granted
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution"
because she was precluded as a non-dependent parent from recovering
from her son's employer." The Georgia Supreme Court held that
because "the Act's differing treatment of dependent and non-dependent
heirs is not irrational and serves the legitimate government purpose of
workers' compensation, the Act's limitation on recovery by non-dependent heirs does not violate the due process or equal protection rights
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.""
X.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Emory University v. Duval,74 the ALJ found that the claimant
sustained an aggravation of a preexisting right shoulder injury, but her
left shoulder injury was not compensable. The Appellate Division
reversed the ruling with respect to the right shoulder, concluding that
the right shoulder condition was not work-related based on medical
evidence other than that relied upon by the ALJ. On appeal, the
superior court reversed and remanded, ordering the Appellate Division
to either accept the ALJ's findings or explain why it did not accept the
evidence relied upon by the ALJ.
In reversing the superior court's
judgment, the court of appeals noted the wide latitude afforded to the
Appellate Division, specifically its authority to substitute its findings of
fact for those of the ALJ.
In contrast, neither the superior court nor
the court of appeals has authority to substitute itself as a fact-finder.
The court of appeals held that because there was ample medical evidence
for the Appellate Division to substitute its findings for those of the ALJ,
the Appellate Division's decision should have been affirmed by the
8
superior court.

70. Id. at 641, 763 S.E.2d at 449.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
72. Barzey, 295 Ga. at 643, 763 S.E.2d at 449-50. The plaintiff challenged on appeal
the U.S. Constitution, as she did not refer to or cite to the Georgia Constitution. See id.
73. Id. at 646, 763 S.E.2d at 452.
74. 330 Ga. App. 663, 768 S.E.2d 832 (2015).
75. Id. at 665, 768 S.E.2d at 833-34, 834.
76. Id. at 665-66, 768 S.E.2d at 834.
77. Id. at 666, 768 S.E.2d at 834-35.
78. Id. at 667, 768 S.E.2d at 835.
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STANDARD OF PROOF-STROKE

The claimant in Save-A-Lot Food Stores v. Amos 79 alleged that he
sustained a work-related stroke, which the employer contested. In
opposition to the opinions of the claimant's family doctor that the
claimant had suffered a stroke and job-related stress was a contributing
factor leading to the stroke, two neurologists found no evidence of a
stroke. The ALJ denied benefits, finding that the claimant had not
shown that he suffered a stroke and, even if there was a stroke, there
was insufficient evidence that it was caused by work-related stress. 80
The Appellate Division affirmed the decision, but struck the portion of
the ALJ's decision stating that the claimant "is required to meet a
higher standard of proof to establish that his alleged stroke is compensable . . . ."" The superior court reversed the denial of benefits because
the employee was held "to an unfairly heightened standard of proof."82
The court of appeals observed that O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4)81 provides
that under the Act, "injury" does not include several medical conditions,
including strokes, unless it is shown by a preponderance of competent
and credible evidence-including medical evidence-that the stroke was
attributable to the performance of the work.84 The court of appeals
recognized that neither the ALJ nor the Appellate Division imposed a
higher burden of proof on the claimant beyond the standard called for in
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4), which the ALJ cited multiple times in his award."
Accordingly, because the correct standard of proof was applied and
evidence in the record existed to support that finding, the superior
court's failure to accept the Appellate Division's findings was reversible
error.8 6
XII.

AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE

Thomas v. Fulton County Board of Education8 1 involved the determination of the claimant's average weekly wage as a school bus driver who
only drove the bus for nine months of the year but received her salary
spread out over twelve months. During the summer months, she worked

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

331 Ga. App. 517, 771 S.E.2d 192 (2015).
Id. at 518-19, 771 S.E.2d at 193, 194.
Id. at 519, 771 S.E.2d at 194.
Id. at 517, 771 S.E.2d at 193.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-1(4) (2008 & Supp. 2015).
Amos, 331 Ga. App. at 520, 771 S.E.2d at 195.
Id.
Id.
331 Ga. App. 828, 771 S.E.2d 482 (2015).
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a second job driving new school buses to various parts of the country.
She sustained a compensable injury on October 19, 2011, and the
thirteen-week period for determining her average weekly wage included
a small window of time before she returned to her regular school-year
job. The ALJ found that the summer work was concurrent (even if not
performed contemporaneous to the school-year work) and, thus, her
average weekly wage was 1/13th of the total earnings from the thirteenweek period, including both jobs. The Appellate Division found that the
two jobs were not performed concurrently and calculated the wages
based on her reduced summer monthly pay, and the superior court
affirmed."
The court of appeals first concluded that the claimant worked
substantially for the entire thirteen-week period because O.C.G.A. § 349-260(1)8' contemplates work for the same or another employer during
the period in question." The court then concluded that the average
weekly wage should be based on the total wages earned for the thirteen
weeks-eleven and a half weeks with the employer and one and a half
weeks with the summer job."
XIII.

SEARCH FOR WORK

Burns v. State Department of Administrative Services92 involved a
claimant who sustained a compensable injury, received benefits and
returned to work, and sought reinstatement of income benefits after she
was fired. The ALJ found that the employer's bases for terminating
employment were pretextual and that the claimant was fired due to her
on-the-job injury. Accordingly, the ALJ awarded benefits and the
Appellate Division adopted this award. On appeal, the superior court set
aside the award, holding that the claimant was required to show either
a diligent job search or that she was working in a restricted capacity
when she was fired but failed to do so.98
The court of appeals first addressed the omission of the hearing
transcript from the record on appeal, noting that the superior court was
required to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
who prevailed before the Appellate Division, and concluded that in the

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 829, 830, 771 S.E.2d at 483, 484.
O.C.G.A. § 34-9-260(1) (2008).
Thomas, 331 Ga. App. at 831-32, 771 S.E.2d at 485.
Id.
331 Ga. App. 11, 769 S.E.2d 733 (2015).
Id. at 12, 769 S.E.2d at 733.
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absence of a hearing transcript, the superior court could not have
performed this function. 9 4
Further, the court of appeals held that the superior court improperly
applied Maloney v. Gordon Farms" and imposed an additional burden
on the claimant, requiring her to show that she had searched for work,
96
or that she was restricted in her work capacity prior to termination.
The court stated that a claimant who is fired for reasons directly related
to a work injury is not required to show a diligent job search before
becoming entitled to income benefits." The court of appeals thus
reversed and remanded the case for the superior court to consider the
complete record and apply the correct legal standard."
XIV.

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF MEDICAL BENEFITS

In Ward v. Pre-EngineerSystems," the court of appeals retroactively
applied workers' compensation benefits-specifically, nurse case
management services-to a 1973 accident. 00 The employer controverted nurse case management services on the grounds that such benefits
were not available under the Act in 1973.101 The court of appeals
upheld the ALJ's and the Appellate Division's award granting nurse case
management services because the result did not cause a non-compensable injury to become compensable but simply affected the scope of the
treatment provided.' 02

XV.

ATTORNEY FEES

In Waters v. PCC Airfoils, LLC,' 0 the court of appeals upheld an
award of assessed attorney fees where some evidence existed to support
a finding of a defense that was at least, in part, unreasonable.1 04 The
claimant alleged bilateral wrist injuries resulting from repetitive work,
and the ATP treated both wrists and eventually recommended surgery
on both hands. After eighteen months of treatment, the ATP opined that
the left wrist injury was work-related, and the employer contested the

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 14, 769 S.E.2d at 735.
295 Ga. 825, 462 S.E.2d 606 (1995).
Burns, 331 Ga. App. at 14-16, 769 S.E.2d at 736.
Burns, 331 Ga. App. at 15, 769 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 16, 769 S.E.2d at 737.
328 Ga. App. 308, 761 S.E.2d 850 (2014).
Id. at 309, 761 S.E.2d at 851.
Id. at 308, 761 S.E.2d at 850.
Id. at 309, 761 S.E.2d at 851.
328 Ga. App. 557, 762 S.E.2d 617 (2014).
Id. at 563, 762 S.E.2d at 621.
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left wrist injury.'o The ALJ awarded benefits for the left wrist and
assessed attorney fees against the employer for an unreasonable defense,
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(1),' 06 and the Appellate Division
adopted this decision.1o' The superior court reversed the award of
attorney fees.10 8

The issue on appeal was whether the superior court erred in reversing
the Appellate Division based on the conflicting or inconsistent medical
evidence.' The court of appeals reversed the superior court decision,
holding that some evidence existed to support the ALJ's determination
of unreasonable defense.' 0 The court determined that the employer
apparently did not controvert the left wrist injury-at least for several
months after the date of the accident, if at all-and deferred to the ALJ's
weighing of the evidence and determination on the credibility of the
doctor's conflicting notes."' Because some evidence supported the
ALJ's finding that the defense was at least, in part, without reasonable
grounds, the award of assessed attorney fees was upheld.112
In Monk v. Parker,"' the court of appeals held that the claimant's
former counsel failed to perfect his attorney fee lien, as required by
Georgia State Board of Workers' Compensation Rule 108(e),"' because
he did not properly serve a copy on all counsel. 15 Subsequent counsel
moved to dismiss former counsel's lien, which the ALJ denied because
the parties had not been harmed since they had received notice of the
lien via the Board's electronic filing system.116 However, the Appellate
Division reversed, holding that notice of electronic filing was not a
substitution for the service requirement under Board Rule 108(e) and,
thus, the lien was not perfected."' The record on appeal was incomplete and lacked many pleadings and filings, including former counsel's
attorney fee lien, the motions relating to the fee lien, and the Appellate

105. Id. at 558, 559, 762 S.E.2d at 618, 618-19. On a motion for reconsideration, the
employer argued that the court ignored two WC-3 controverts of the claim, however, the
court's review of the record and the Appellate Division's record index did not reveal any
indication of the controverts. Id. at 563, 762 S.E.2d at 621.
106. O.C.G.A. § 34-9-108(b)(1) (2008).
107. Waters, 328 Ga. App. at 559, 762 S.E.2d at 619.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 558, 762 S.E.2d at 618.
110. Id. at 557, 762 S.E.2d at 617-18.
111. Id. at 561-62, 762 S.E.2d at 620.
112. Id. at 563, 762 S.E.2d at 621.
113. 331 Ga. App. 736, 771 S.E.2d 424 (2015).
114. Ga. Bd. Workers' Comp. R. 108(e) (2015).
115. Monk, 331 Ga. App. at 740-41, 771 S.E.2d at 428.
116. Id. at 737-38, 771 S.E.2d at 426.
117. Id. at 739, 771 S.E.2d at 427.
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Division-approved stipulation and agreement (settlement); consequently,
the court was unable to consider those documents. 1 ' The court of
appeals found no error in the superior court's affirmation and was
unable to address former counsel's argument that he was divested of a
property right established in the stipulation and agreement because
those documents were not part of the record on appeal.'
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Id. at 736, 771 S.E.2d at 425.
Id. at 741, 771 S.E.2d at 428.

